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Agricultural Protection in Developing 
Countries 
Lilyan E. Fulginiti and Jason F. Shogren 
Countries often have a Jekyll-Hyde relationship 
with their agricultural sector-policy makers both 
tax and subsidize agriculture. In the early stages 
of a country's development, policy makers ex- 
ploit agriculture through export taxes and over- 
valued exchange rates. In contrast, agricultural 
policy in advanced industrial countries has 
strongly protected domestic producers by means 
of trade restrictions, direct price or income sup- 
ports, and public investment. 
The present paper explores why farmers are 
taxed in poor countries and subsidized in rich 
countries. Using the economic theory of con- 
tests to come to an understanding of the incen- 
tives for agricultural protectionism, we f ~ s t  sketch 
a framework for an excludable and rivalrous rent. 
We then apply this framework to agricultural 
protectionism in developing countries. 
A Contest for Agricultural Protection 
Olson ( 1982) uses his theory of collective action 
to explain the dual treatment of agriculture and 
industry. Benefits of collective lobbying for a 
rent must be shared among the lobbying group- 
either shared equally for a public good or ac- 
cording to some sharing rule for a divisible pri- 
vate good. If there is a great number of potential 
beneficiaries, the cash of securing the good may 
not be borne equally by all who benefit. There- 
fore, there is little incentive to engage in col- 
lective lobbying to secure a government rent, 
and such groups are unorganized or poorly man- 
aged. This is so with the agricultural sector in 
less-developed countries. In comparison, the 
manufacturing sector has fewer players. There, 
because of lower transaction costs, the benefits 
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of collective action outweigh the costs, a fact 
implying strong lobbying to obtain the rent (Bates 
and Rogerson). But as the transaction costs of 
forming a collective decrease through improved 
transportation, education, and information sy s- 
tems, the balance of power can shift. Eventu- 
ally, the agricultural sector will find it profitable 
to form an effective collective lobby, which will 
benefit from government subsidies. 
If the rent is a private good, excludable and 
rivalrous in consumption, several other issues 
become important. For example, if the rent is a 
direct subsidy to the industrial or the agricultural 
sector, players within the sector compete to re- 
ceive support. The overall rent is depleted as 
one player receives the subsidy. The economic 
theory of contests becomes a useful framework 
to further our understanding of such cases (Tul- 
lock). Next, we sketch the framework for a rent- 
seeking contest between agricultural and indus- 
trial sectors. 
By selecting the rent and who receives it, the 
regulator plays the key role in this model (Ap- 
plebaum and Katz). Let G, = S, + TI be the rent 
( i  = 1, 0, . . ., k), where S, is the subsidy won 
and T, the tax avoided if the player is victorious. 
The regulator can award the rent either to in- 
dustry or agriculture. For each strategy, the reg- 
ulator's expected utility is represented by 
where .ni(.) is the likelihood of the regulator's 
remaining in office given the rent-seeking effort 
of agriculture X and industry Y. Rent-seeking 
efforts depend upon relative strength of the sec- 
tor a, the level of rent G,, the sector's sharing 
rule m1 or m,,, and political or institutional en- 
vironment W .  Let TR = P(X(-) + Y ( - ) )  be the 
fraction of rent-seeking expenditures received 
by the regulator, 0 5 @ 5 1; 5 the nonmonetary 
social welfare concerns (possibly zero); and z 
the regulator's income if -she is removed from 
office. W can be interpreted as the nature of the 
Copyright 1992 American Agricultural Economics Association 
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playing field. The regulator's problem is to se- 
lect the strategy maximizing her expected util- 
ity: 
If information is imperfect, groups must de- 
cide how much effort to invest to increase the 
probability of winning the reward. Individual 
players in the agricultural and the industrial sec- 
tors expend efforts, x, and y,, to increase the 
1ikeIihood of winning a subsidy and avoiding a 
iax. The probability that the agricultural sector 
wins some rent is p,(X, aHW) = ErIi p , ( . ) ,  
whereX = Z:=, x, and Y = Ey=, y,. If a > 1, 
manufacturing is more poweriul than agricul- 
ture; a < I implies the opposite. The strength 
term represents factors influencing the produc- 
tivity of rent seeking. We initially assume a > 
1 in developing countries. We &stify this as- 
sumption by noting Olson's argument that, al- 
though in the early stage of a country's eco- 
nomic development the majority of its people 
engage in agriculture, demand for farm price 
supports is typically quite weak as a result of 
the high cost of coordinating farmers' rent-seek- 
ing activities. AgriculturaI populations are rel- 
atively uneducated, are scattered over a wide 
area, and have poor communication and trans- 
portation systems. Benefits from lobbying for 
higher prices are minimal because a small share 
of subsistence farmers' production is sold. No 
other significant groups, such as domestic in- 
dustries supplying f& inpuh, have yet emerged 
to argue for policies favorable to agriculture. 
In contrast, demand for industrial assistance 
policies is relatively strong. Industrialists are 
typically better educated than agriculturalists, are 
based in urban centers, and are relatively small 
in numbers. The cost of collective political lob- 
bying activity is comparatively low. Two major 
benefits arise from lobbying against subsidized 
agricultural prices. First, increased agricultural 
export earnings increase the supply of foreign 
exchange, lowering ~ t s  price. Currency appre- 
ciation lowers the local currency price of im- 
pon-competing manufactures. Second, benefits 
accrue from the impact of Iow food prices on 
wages. Industrialists support workers in resist- 
ing food price increases for fear of increased liv- 
ing cost and resulting demands of higher wages. 
Because urban wage earners have low incomes 
and a large Engel coefficient, high food prices 
tend to trigger urban disruption. 
Players in agricultural and manufacturing sec- 
tors now select first, the optimal sharing rule 
detailing how the prize will be divided within 
the sector if victorious, second, the optimal tim- 
ing of effort (should the group move first or af- 
ter its opponent has moved?), and third, the level 
of effort. If G is a public good, then the sharing 
rule will not depend upon effort. If G is a div- 
isible prize, as in protectionism, a sharing rule 
must explicitly examine how the prize will be 
divided. Let the shares to individuals in the two 
sectors be 
where cp (0 5 cp 5 1 )  is the weight factor ( c p  = 
0, implying an effort-independent sharing rule, 
and rp = 1, implying an effort-dependent rule). 
Baik and Shogren demonstrate that if n > m ,  
the larger group (agriculture) will emphasize the 
effort-independent sharing rule and the other 
group (manufacturing) will emphasize the ef- 
fort-dependent sharing rule. Even if the reward 
is a private good, individuals in the agricultural 
group will have an incentive to free ride, a fact 
suggesting less effort in the contest. 
Given the optimal sharing rules, players in both 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors noncoop- 
eratively select x, and y, to maximize expected 
profits: 
Max[p,(X,aYIW)Gq, - x , ]  i = I, . . . ,  n 
Max [p , (X ,  cry1 W)GU,. - y,] j = 1, . . . , m ,  
where p,(X, ~ Y ~ W ) G  = c:I~ p i -  G, and p,,(X, 
a~ IW)G = C:=,-,p, . G,. Figure 1 illustrates the 
model for the simple case of four rent levels- 
no rent (Go),  low rent (G,) ,  high rent (CH), and 
very high rent (G,). The first row in the payoff 
vectors reflect the regulator's expected utility; 
the second and third rows are expected payoffs 
to agriculture and industry. 
Given that the contest bias term affects effort, 
the sector supported by the regulator may well 
change as the economy develops. As subsist- 
ence farmers become more commercialized, the 
share of market production expands, increasing 
potential benefits from seeking higher produc- 
tion prices. As the farm population declines, their 
education level rises, and communication and 
transportation infrastructures in rural areas im- 
prove. Rural people may become more sensitive 
about their relative position in terms of income 
and standard of living, while the cost of orga- 
nizing themselves declines. Fanner organiza- 
Fulginiti and Shogren 
Re ulator's 
~hoylee of Aent 
and AHocatlon 
Figure 1. Regulator's choice of actions 
No Rent-4, 
tions emerge that, once established, have a vested 
interest in lobbying not only on behalf of farm- 
ers but also on behalf of themselves. The same 
is true of a new group of manufacturing and ser- 
vice industries producing farm inputs and pro- 
cessing farm outputs. Consequently, the contest 
bias approaches unity (a -+ 1) when agriculture 
and manufacturing become equally powerful rent 
seekers. 
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Market intervention policies have played a ma- 
jor role in the differential performance of the 
agricultural sectors of both developing and de- 
veloped countries. These policies include price 
supports, taxes, subsidies, tariffs, and ex- 
change-rate market interventions. Agricultural 
poIicy in advanced industrial counrries has been 
characterized by strong protection of domestic 
producers by means of trade restrictions and di- 
rect price supports. In contrast, developing 
countries have exploited agriculture by such 
means as export taxes and overvalued exchange 
rates. 
Table 1 summarizes average nominal rates of 
agricultural protection in 33 developed, newly 
industrialized, and developing countries. The 
table presents estimates of the degrees of direct 
and indirect intervention in agricultural com- 
modities. These protection coefficients are in- 
dices representing between 50 and 80% of the 
total value of agricultural output for each of the 
countries. The first column illustrates the impact 
of "direct" pricing policies. The direct nominal 
protection rate measures the proportional differ- 
ence between the domestic producer price and 
the border price (after adjustment for transport, 
storage, and other costs and quality differen- 
tials) measured at the official exchange rate. 
Figures for 13 developed countries and two newly 
industrialized countries (Korea and Taiwan) in- 
cluded in table 1 are averages of those figures 
obtained by Anderson and Hayami. 
Studies financed by the World Bank have 
provided data on domestic and border prices of 
agricultural commodities, exchange rate market 
intervention, and protection afforded to the non- 
agricultural sector of I8  developing countries 
from 1960 to 1984. Direct nominaI protection 
rates show that most countries adopted policies 
resulting in the equivalent of export taxes on ag- 
ricultural commodities. ' Brazil and Turkey are 
among countries protecting the agricultural sec- 
tor because they are traditionaI importers of food 
products. The most surprising finding, shown in 
the second column, is the impact of indirect in- 
' Developing countries stud~cd contaln a much rtchcr and d~s-  
aggregated data set of protection ratcs at the level of  ~ndtvidual 
cornrnodtt~es. A stmplc average of all 18 countries shows subs~dtes 
of  3 1 %  for stapks, 12% for ~rnponables, and 15% for exportables 
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Table 1. Nominal Rates of Agricultural Protection 
Country Period Direct Indirect Tutal 
Sw~tzerland 55-80 85.8 
lapan 55-80 60.5 
Italy 55-80 54.5 
Sweden 55-80 49.2 
Germany 55-80 45.2 
France 55-80 32.5 
The Netherlands 55-80 28.3 
United Kingdom 55-80 27.5 
Korea 55-80 18.5 
Denmark 55-80 12 3 
B raz~ l  69-83 10 1 - 18.4 -8 3 
Taiwan 55-80 8.3 
United States 55-80 4 5 
Turkey 60-83 4 2 -36 8 -32.6 
Ausrral~a 55-80 2 8 
Canada 55-80 2 5 
New Zealand 55-80 -1.0 
Ch11e 60-83 - 1.2 -20.4 -21.6 
Philipp~nes 60-86 -4 1 -23 3 -27 4 
Colornb~a 60-83 -4 8 -25.2 - 30.0 
Paktstan 60-86 -6.4 -33 1 -39 5 
Srl Lanka 60-85 -9.0 -31 , l  -40 1 
Malay sta 69-83 -9.4 -8.2 - 17 6 
Morocco 63-84 - 15.0 - [ 7 4  -32 4 
Zambia 66-84 -16 3 -29 9 -46 2 
Portugal 60-84 - [ 6 6  - I  2 -17 8 
Argentina 60-84 - [7  8 -21 3 -39 1 
Dom~nican Republic 66-85 -18 6 -21 3 -39 9 
Egypt 64-84 -24.8 - 19.6 -44.4 
Thailand 62-84 -25.1 - 15.0 -40.1 
Cote d'lvorre 60-82 -25.7 -23.3 -49 0 
Ghana 58-76 -26.9 - 3 2  6 -59 5 
Sources. Anderson and hay am^: Valdcs 
tervention . Indirect effects include both the ef- 
fect of trade and macroeconomic policies on the 
exchange rate and the extent of protection af- 
forded to nonagricultural commodities. Dis- 
crimination against agricuItura1 commodities in 
policies external to agriculture has a greater im- 
pact on agricultural incentives (a tax equivalent 
of 23%) than do policies aimed directIy at ag- 
riculture. The results for total price interven- 
tions, however, show that the dominant pattern 
has been one of systematic and sizeable discrim- 
ination against agriculture (Valdes). 
Our framework suggests the optimal policy 
choice is conditioned by the contest strength term, 
a ,  and by the poIitical institutional environment 
term, W. The regulator chooses intervention 
levels measured by the nominal protection coef- 
ficient. The nominaI protection coefficient re- 
flects relative group strength and other aspects 
of the political process, such as equity, that af- 
fect the probability of the regulator's remaining 
in power. Using World Bank data, we estimate 
a reduced form equation for a set of 18 devel- 
oping countries with the objective of rdentifying 
a relation between policy choice and factors af- 
fecting a and W. The dependent variable is the 
nominal protection coefficient (NPC) for key 
agricultural  product^.^ The NPC is the mult~ple 
by which government policies have raised the 
domestic value of agricultural output above its 
value at international prices. 
Three variables are used to capture players' 
relative efficiencies as rent seekers-share of 
agriculture in GDP, share of agriculture in labor 
force, and share of agriculture in consumption. 
We hypothesize that the agricultural sector's rent- 
seeking power declines as the sector's relative 
size increases. Larger sectors cost more to sub- 
sidize, are more difficult to organize, and are 
more likely to be subsistence sectors, implying 
they could benefit Iess from price enhancement. 
! T'ncrc arc three to seven products lncluded per country. These 
products represent from 60 to 80% of agr~cul~ural produc[~c>n. For 
detalls, see Fulplnlti and Shogren 
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Institutional environment, constituent wel- 
fare, and other considerations will also a f k r  the 
probability that a certain sector will be taxed. 
First, we consider public finance motives for 
taxing agriculture versus other sectors. Land per 
capita and producrivity per person in agriculture3 
are used, based upon the hypothesis that the 
public revenue potential of agricultural taxation 
rises with the value of agricultural resources. Ir 
is therefore expecred that the greater the labor 
productivity in agriculture and the more land per 
capita, the less the protection afforded to agri- 
cultural commodities. The share of agriculture 
in trade and the dummy variables for both ex- 
portables and importables are introduced to re- 
flect developing countries' preference of com- 
modity over income taxadon. Tradables are easier 
to tax than nontradables . 
Second, we examine equity and distributional 
motives for taxing agriculrure versus other sec- 
tors. Two variables are included to capture eq- 
uity considerations-interventions in the ex- 
change rate market and import substitution 
policies on the agricultural sector. Currency 
overvaluation, represented by the ratio of the 
equilibrium exchange rate to the actual ex- 
change rate, is assumed to link macropolicy and 
the agricultural sector. The issue is whether there 
is more pressure for direct protection in pro- 
portion to how overvalued the currency be- 
comes, a relation implying the offsetting effect 
of commodity market intervention. The indirect 
protection coefficient (NPCI), captures both the 
effects of import policies protecting the non- 
agricultural sector and the effects of policies 
distorting the exchange rate market. These vari- 
ables are included to allow evaluation of whether 
the regulator has a tendency to use price pro- 
tection to redistribute towards the group subject 
to heavy indirect taxes. 
Third, we consider the "food favoritism" mo- 
tive for taxing agriculture versus other sectors. 
We hypothesize food products will be subject to 
tax treatment different from nonfood products as 
both self-sufficiency in food production and cheap 
food are often policy objectives in developing 
countries. To identify possible differential treat- 
ment, a dummy variable for food products is in- 
troduced. 
' The productivity ratio is an ~ndex of  the ratio of labor produc- 
tlvlty In agnculture to labor productiv~ty In industry. Labor pro- 
ductivity in agnculture 1s measured as agricultural output per worker, 
and labor productivity in Industry is approximated as average GDP 
per worker for the wholc wonomy 
Fourth, we include residual effects system- 
atically related to income. The country's weaith, 
represented by income per capita, captures rel- 
ative differences in development and is intro- 
duced as a proxy for characreristics thar are 
country-specific and have not been captured by 
variables already included. 
Regression analysis is used on a pooled cross 
section time series data set of 18 countries from 
1960-84 and yields 1,858 data points. Interpre- 
tation of the coefficients as causal impacts on 
protection should be made with caution because 
explanatory variables might depend upon pro- 
tection level. Thus we will refer to association 
rather than to causation, given the possibility of 
simultaneous equation bias. The regression was 
run in log-linear form, except for variables rep- 
resenting the relative shares of the agricultural 
sector and of agricultural trade in the economy. 
Table 2 summarizes estimations for different 
combinations of explanatory variables, regres- 
sions ( 1 ) to (4). The coefficient of determination 
indicata that about 60% of the variarion in NPCs 
among countries and over time are explained. 
Coefficients of the three proxies of the contest 
strength term fi have the expected sign but are 
insignificant. This fact does not mean rhat the 
sector's relative rent-seeking power is a factor 
to be disregarded; rather, it might reflect the 
quality of the variables used to capture a. Both 
variables used ro reflect public revenue potential 
of agricultural taxation-land per capita and la- 
bor productivity ratio-show the expected sign 
and are highly significant. This confirms the be- 
lief that agriculrurally well-endowed economies 
rend to discriminate against the sector and ex- 
tract some land rents. 
The share of agricultural trade in GDP seems 
important inasmuch as it shows a negative cor- 
relation to NPCs and provides evidence that de- 
veloping countries favor generating revenue by 
taxing exportable commodities. The greater the 
proporiion of agricultural commodities ex- 
ported, the more likely regulators will be to tax 
the sector. Coefficients of both exponable and 
importable dummies are significant, indicating 
thar importables are protected relative to ex- 
portables. The two variables suggesting equity 
considerations are highly significant, indicating 
that when the real exchange rate is low, there is 
pressure for protection. The more the secror is 
indirectly taxed, the less it is directly taxed, 
supporting rhe hy porhesis thar a regulator will 
lessen ihe burden of the sector under heavy tax- 
ation. The coefficient of the food dummy vari- 
able is insignificant, suggesting rhat food and 
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Table 2. 1960-84 Regressions for Nominal Protection Coefficien (I-statistics in 
parentheses) 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (41 
Share of agriculture 
in GDP 
m labor force 
Land per capita 
Labor productivity ratlo 
Share of ag, trade in GDP 
E~portables 
Importables 
Currency overvaluation 
NPR lndirect 
Food 
Income per capita 
Intercept 
R ' 
-0. LOO 
(-3 98) 
-0.007 
(-5.64) 
0.260 
(2 88) 
0 630 
(7 22) 
0 220 
(3 31) 
nonfood products are treated alike. The effect 
of average income is significant and positive, 
indicadng country characreristics related to wealth 
are not accounted for by the remaining vari- 
ables. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper examines policy intervention in ag- 
riculture as the outcome of the interaction be- 
tween self-interested politicians and producer and 
consumer groups affected by policy choices. 
According to this approach, politicians compet- 
ing for support choose the intervention level 
maximizing their expected utility without jeop- 
ardizing the likelihood of their remaining in of- 
fice. Players in the agricultural and the manu- 
facturing sectors decide how much effort to invest 
in order to increase rhe probability of winning 
the rent created by the regulator's policy choice. 
Their choice depends upon the strategic timing 
of effort and on the sharing rule, given the rel- 
ative strength of the groups involved. Players' 
strength is captured by a contest bias term hy- 
pothesized to depend upon disparities in income 
endowments between groups, deadweight losses 
of redistribution, cost of developing and main- 
taining polidcally cohesive groups, and avail- 
ability of tax instruments. 
Regression analysis on pooled cross-secdon, 
time series data of 18 developing counrries re- 
veals that agriculturally well-endowed econo- 
mies discriminate against agriculture; the higher 
the proportion of agricultural exports, the more 
likely that regulators wrll tax the sector; and as 
a result of equity considerations, the more a sec- 
tor is directly taxed, the less it will be indirectly 
taxed. 
Our paper has been motivated in part by Bald- 
win. By emphasizing the economic self-interest 
of the political participants, we have attempted 
to "understand the policy-making process that 
leads politicians to disregard the advice of econ- 
omists on issues of inrernational trade." Eco- 
nomic self-interest aImost a1 ways dominates when 
a significant part of an individual's income is 
affected by policy choice. National and group 
concerns are likely to dominate personal con- 
siderations only when economic self-interesr ef- 
fects are small or unclear. Although we recog- 
nize thar an individual's social concerns can play 
an important role in shaping her decisions, our 
Fulginiri and Shogren 
framework suggests that economic self-interest 
explains a certain degree of agricultural protec- 
tionism. 
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